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1. Introduction
The concept of a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is indeed quite ambitious if the
underlying severe requirements on agent’s information gathering and processing capabilities
are considered. It is therefore not surprising that many attempts have been made in order to
justify this concept and to state a clear set of assumptions that imply rational expectations
on the side of the agents. One such attempt is the concept of a strongly rational expectations
equilibrium (SREE) proposed by Guesnerie (1992, 2002). This concept asks, whether an
REE can be educed by rational agents, meaning that the REE is the solution of some kind of
mental process of reasoning of the agents. A SREE is then a REE that is learned by agents
using this ‘eductive’ mental process (equivalently, the REE is said to be eductively stable).
As shown by Guesnerie (1992, 2002), eductive learning of rational expectations is possible,
if based on a suitably speciﬁed game–form of the model, agent’s use an iterative process
to eliminate non–best responses from their strategy sets and if this process converges to the
REE. It turns out that an REE is not necessarily a SREE, but that additional restrictions have
to met for a SREE to exist. Guesnerie (2002) provides an overview over the conditions for
existence of SREE that have been derived in various economic contexts.
Among other things, the concept of a SREE has been successfully applied to models with
private information, which usually exhibit quite complex rational expectations equilibria.
Conditions for existence of a SREE have been derived for models, where agents are unable
to use the information transmitted through current market prices (cf. Heinemann (2003)),
as well as for models, where this information can be used (cf. Desgranges et al. (2003),
Desgranges (1999), Heinemann (2002)). However, a common feature of all these studies
is that they assume an exogenously given amount of private information. This means that
so far not only the question how this private information comes into the market has been
ignored. It also means that by now it has not been analyzed, whether the endogenization of
private information acquisition causes additional restrictions an REE must fulﬁll in order to
be eductively stable.
The present paper tries to ﬁll this gap. We will introduce endogenous information acqui-
sition into a simple market model and are able to derive conditions for existence of a SREE
given this endogenously acquired information. Regarding the introduction of endogenous
information acquisition, we follow the seminal work by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
and more precisely Verrecchia (1982) who has analyzed rational expectations equilibria
with endogenous acquisition of information in a quite similar economic environment. The
present analysis considers two different equilibrium concepts that are both reasonable in theStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 2
framework underlying our analysis. Initially, we will look at equilibria without learning from
prices, where agents are not able to use the information transmitted trough current market
prices for their owndecisions.Thismodelcorresponds for exampletoa situationwhere every
agentmakesan irreversibleproductiondecisionbefore he/sheknowstheprice(thisisthecase
of the cobweb models). After that, we will consider a more demanding equilibrium concept,
where agents are able to use the information revealed by prices. This model is inspired from
the well-known literature about REE under asymmetric information à la Grossman (1976).
The central results of the paper can be summarized as follows: As long as equilibria
without learning from prices are considered, the opportunity to acquire private information
endogenously leads to no conditions for existence of a SREE beyond that known for the case
with exogenously given information. This, however, is not true for equilibria with learning
from prices. Here, the conditions for existence of a SREE turn out to be stronger than the
respective conditions for the case with exogenously given information.
This striking difference between these two results is driven by the following intuition:
In the ﬁrst model where no information is extracted from the price by agents, endogenous
acquisition of private information does not create additional difﬁculties of coordinating
expectations. In other words, at the time where he/she makes his/her decision, every agent
needs to guess the price to make an optimal choice. To this purpose, it is enough to guess the
shape of the supply and demand curves. In particular, no agent is concerned by the precision
of the information acquired by others. Hence, the conditions for stability of the REE (i.e.
existence of a SREE) are not affected by endogenous acquisition of private information and
they depend on the relative slope of the demand and supply curves only.
In the second model where agents use the informational content of the price, the problem
is quite different, and endogenous acquisition of private information does create additional
difﬁculties of coordinating expectations. Namely, every agent needs to know the precision of
information acquired by others in order to correctly understand the informational content of
the price. The condition for existence of a SREE in the model with information transmitted
by the price deserves some more comments. This condition states that the price must not be
too informative, with respect to the informativeness of the private information acquired by
agents.Theunderlyingintuitionisthatthe informationalcontentof theprice isdeterminedby
the correlation between private information and agents’ decisions. As long as the price is not
very informative, this correlation is easy to predict. But, when the price is very informative,
agents’ decisions mainly depend on the beliefs about the informational content of the price,
andagents’decisionsare therefore noteasy topredict.Thisconditionfor existenceof aSREEStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 3
is quite analogous to the condition in the case with exogenously given precision of private
information. Still, it is a more demanding condition. The fact that endogenous information
acquisition makes it more difﬁcult for a SREE to exist can be explained as follows: As
already explained above, when the price is very informative, the REE is not eductively
stable because every agent reacts less to his private information than to his beliefs about
the information revealed by the price. In this case, given that private information is not very
useful to agents, the precision of the private information acquired decreases. This last fact
reinforces the stability problem. Namely, agents become much less reactive to their private
information. Hence, agents’ decisions depend more on their beliefs, which corresponds to a
greater instability problem.
Lastly, an interesting feature of this stronger condition for existence of a SREE is that it
ensures that the problem described by the the Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox (cf. Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980)) cannot occur. This famous paradox claims that existence of informationally
efﬁcient markets is impossible, since it is impossible to explain how information comes
into the market in the ﬁrst place. Namely, as long as the price publicly reveals all the
relevant information, there is no incentive to acquire costly private information. But, if no
one acquires information in order to make an accurate decision, the price cannot aggregate
any information.Our ‘solution’of the GS paradox buildson two points.Firstly,our condition
for existence of a SREE implies that, as soon as a SREE exists,each ﬁrm can educe that there
is always a positive amount of private information in the market, because the incentive to
free–ride on others’ information must be bounded from above. Secondly, when a SREE does
not exist (meaning that there is a REE that is not a SREE), the ‘eductive theory’ is not meant
to make an accurate prediction of the market outcome. It only states that the REE is not a
plausible outcome (or, at least, is not more plausible than many other outcomes). Although
we give no formal content to this claim, we conclude that this additional uncertainty should
create incentives to acquire private information.
2. A competitive market model
The model that builds the framework of our analysis is a model of a competitive market with
a continuum of risk neutral ﬁrms in I = [0;1]. Market demand X is random, but the inverse





Here, e is a normally distributed demand shock with zero mean and precision te. b > 0 and
f > 0 are known constants. Every ﬁrms faces increasing marginal costs that are affected byStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 4




where y > 0. The cost parameter q is unknown to the ﬁrms. The ﬁrms, however, know that
this parameter is drawn from a normal distribution with mean ¯ q and precision t.
Private informationon the side of the ﬁrms regarding the unknownparameter is introduced
intothe modelby allowingfor endogenousacquisitionof informationas inVerrecchia (1982)
(generalizing the seminal framework of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). It is assumed that
each ﬁrm isabletoperforman experiment(independentfromexperimentsof otherﬁrms)that
reveals additional but costly information regarding the unknown parameter q. In particular, it
is assumed that each ﬁrm i 2 I can acquire a costly private signal s(i) that reveals additional
private information. The private signal is given by s(i) = q+u(i), where the signal’s noise
u(i) is normally distributed with mean zero and precision t(i)u. The costs of acquiring a
signal with precision t(i)u are given by K(t(i)u) and we let k(t(i)u) denote the respective
marginal costs. The objective of a ﬁrm is to maximize the expected proﬁt, where ex-ante








Costs are are assumed to be increasing and convex: k(t(i)u)  0 and k0(t(i)u)  0 for all
t(i)u  0.
Throughout the following analysis it will always be assumed that the average of the ﬁrm’s
private signals reveals the unknown value of the unknown parameter by the law of large
numbers, such that
R 1
0 s(i)di = q because
R 1
0 u(i)di = 0.
In what follows, we will ﬁrst consider equilibria of this simple market model, where the
ﬁrms are unable to use the information transmitted trough prices. This simply means, that
every ﬁrm must decide on her proﬁt maximizing output, before the actual market price
becomes known and is unable to condition her supply decision on the market price. An
equilibrium concept, where such learning from prices is possible because the information
transmitted through prices can be used, will be analyzed in section 4.
3. SREE without learning from prices
3.1. Description of the REE
We will start here with a brief description of the kind of REE that appears, when decisions
are made before the actual market price becomes known. Because of the distributional
assumptions made above, this REE takes a quite simple form: In equilibrium, each ﬁrm’s
supply decision x(i) will be a linear function of the estimator for the unknown parameter qStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 5
based on public information and — if the ﬁrm chooses to acquire private information — the
private signal s(i) the ﬁrm observes. The decision to acquire information altogether, in turn
depends on the marginal costs and beneﬁts associated with private information acquisition.
The next result summarizes the properties of the REE:
Proposition 1. Let a =  y=f < 0. The model then possesses an unique linear REE with the
following properties:
(i) Each ﬁrm i 2 I will acquire the same level of precision t(i)
u = t
u = maxf0; ˜ tug of her




(t+(1 a)˜ tu)2 = k(˜ tu) (2)



























Proof. See Appendix. 2
Existence and uniqueness of a linear equilibrium in various cases of CARA/Gaussian
settings is a very common result, and this result deserves few comments only. A market
equilibrium with private information acquisition (i.e., t
u > 0) will therefore exist only if the
marginal beneﬁt of informationacquisitionat zero (i.e.,
y
2t2), is greater than the marginal cost
of information acquisition at zero (i.e., k(0)). In what follows, we assume that this condition
is satisﬁed. Thus, there always exists a nontrivial REE, where individual acquisition of
information takes place. For simplicity, we will also sometimes make the assumption that
the marginal costs of information acquisition are constant, such that k(t(i)u)) = ¯ k > 0 for all
t(i)u > 0. Under this assumption, a REE with information acquisition (i.e., t(i)
u = t
u > 0 for
all i 2 I) exists if and only if Q 
q
y
2 ¯ k > t. From the equilibrium condition (2) we obtain




3.2. Existence of a SREE
Since detailed descriptions of of the concept of a SREE are already available in the literature
(cf. Guesnerie (2002)), it is adequate to limit the present analysis to an informal and
pragmatic treatment of this concept and the game–theoretical issues that are involved here.
The fundamental question associated with the concept of a SREE is whether the assumptionsStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 6
of individual rationality and common knowledge are sufﬁcient to predict a particular REE
as an outcome of a model. Therefore it is necessary to look at a suitable game–form of the
model and to analyze the best responses of the individualﬁrms to actions taken by other ﬁrms
in order to derive conditions for eductive stability. If we conﬁne our analysis to linear supply
functions, such that an individual ﬁrm’s supply is given by x(i) = y[g(i)0 +g(i)1s(i)], the
respective best response mapping can be summarized by the equations listed in the following
Lemma: 3
Lemma 1. If aggregate behavior is summarized by the coefﬁcients g0 =
R 1
0 g(j)0d j and
g1 =
R 1
0 g(j)1d j, the best response g(i)0, g(i)1 as well as t(i)u of a ﬁrm i 2 I is uniquely

















This Lemma (that is central to the study of stability, as will soon be clear) calls for several
comments:
(i) The best response mapping deﬁned by the above Equations (3a)–(3c) map the three real
parameters (g0;g1;tu) into the three real parameters (g(i)0;g(i)1;t(i)u) characterizing
the best response of ﬁrm i (where the aggregate value tu =
R 1
0 t(j)ud j is deﬁned
analogously to g0 and g1).
(ii) Notice that (g(i)0;g(i)1;t(i)u) is not affected by tu, i.e., the precision of the information
acquired by others. Intuitively, ﬁrm i makes his supply decision considering (1) his
information on q (that is si only as there is no learning from the price), and (2)
his information on the price, that consists in the market clearing equation p = b+
a[g0+g1
R 1
0 s(j)d j]+e, where e and
R 1
0 s(j)d j = q are unknown. Thus, given that the
precision of the aggregate information
R 1
0 s(j)d j on q does not depend on the individual
precisions t(j)u (it is inﬁnite), the decision made by ﬁrm i does not depend on the t(j)u
either.
(iii) Furthermore, the decision of ﬁrm i can be separated into two successive problems. To
see this, notice ﬁrst that equation (3c) deﬁnes t(i)u as a function of g(i)1 and rewrite
3 Optimal output of a ﬁrm is given by x(i) = y E[p qjs(i)]. Hence, this linear supply rule assumes that
E[p qjs(i)] = g(i)0+g(i)1s(i).Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 7










It follows that, on the one hand, the supply function of ﬁrm i is determined by the
expected aggregate supply curve (characterized by (g0;g1)), and, on the other hand, the
precision of the private information is determined on the basis of g(i)1 through the map
F. This last remark will have essential consequences to the stability problem.
We can now turn attention to the question of the strong rationality (or stability) of the
REE. By deﬁnition, the REE g
0, g
1 and t
u is a ﬁxed point of the best response mapping
(3a)–(3c). In particular, equation 3b) implies that g
1  0. Again, a detailed account of the
analytical characterization of SREE is given in Guesnerie (2002). We just recall here that
this REE is a SREE (or, equivalently is ”eductively stable”) if and only if it is a locally stable
stationary point of the dynamical system made up from this best response mapping. Now,
with respect to this dynamical system, the eigenvalues l1, l2 and l3 of the Jacobian matrix
at the equilibrium point can be computed as follows: 4










Since we have assumed that marginal costs of information acquisition are increasing or
at least constant, we have k0(tu)  0 for all tu. Therefore, we always have l3 < a and the
condition jaj < 1 is necessary and sufﬁcient for local stability ands thus for existence of a
SREE:
Proposition 2. The linear REE with private information acquisition is locally eductively
stable if and only if jaj < 1
Basically, this condition requires  1 < a < 0, since a =  y=f, where y and f are positive
constants. Interestingly, this condition is exactly identical to the respective stabilitycondition
for the case with exogenously given private information (cf. Heinemann (2003)). As long
as equilibria without learning from prices are considered, we therefore get no change with
4 Details on the computation of the eigenvalues of this dynamical system are given in the appendix at the end
of the proof of Lemma 1.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 8













regard to the conditionsfor existenceof a SREE, even if we allow for endogenousacquisition
of information.
To understand the intuition for this surprising result, we go back to the above comments
to Lemma 1. In these comments, we have explained that the ﬁrst ‘supply’ decision is made
independently of the precisions of private information, and that the ‘precision’ decision does
not add further ‘expectational difﬁculties’, i.e. the choice of g(i)1 requires to guess other’s
behavior, but, once g(i)1 has been chosen, t(i)u is simply F[g(i)1], it does not depend on
others’ behavior (g(i)0;g(i)1). Summing up, (1) the decision of ﬁrm i is not affected by
expectation about others’ precision of information
R 1
0 t(j)ud j, and (2) the choice of t(i)u is
unambiguouslymade, onceg(i)1 hasbeen chosen.Thus,as far as thequestionofexpectations
coordination is concerned, it is enough to look at the system (g0;g1), and it is useless to look
at tu. This intuition is clearly emphasized in the speciﬁc case with constant marginal costs
described below.
Under the assumption of constant marginal costs of information acquisition, it is quite
easy to give a graphical representation of the stability condition and the iterative process
that leads to the REE. Under the assumption that k(tu) = ¯ k such that k0 = 0, Equation (3c)
gives t(i)u =  Qg(i)1, where Q was already deﬁned above. Then, the best response mapping









where the variables tu and t(i)u do not appear, as explained above. The ﬁrst equation
characterizes the dynamics of g0, while the second describes the dynamics of g1.
For example, consider the dynamics of g1 as depicted in ﬁgure 1. To draw the ﬁgure,
denote g
1 the equilibrium weight of private information (such that g
1 = g(g







the root of g, and notice that existence of an REE with t
u > 0 implies Q > t
such that g(0)< 0. Thus, whenever the stability condition stated in Proposition 2 is satisﬁed,
suchthat 1<a<0,we have ˜ g1 < 1+ t
Q.Figure1canthenbeusedtodescribetheiterative
process of elimination of non-best responses that converges to this REE. This process is
illustrated in the ﬁgure, starting from the assumption that it is common knowledge that no
ﬁrm uses a weight g(i)1 greater than zero. 5 This necessarily implies that g1  0 and from the
ﬁgure it can be seen that in this case no ﬁrm will ever choose a weight g(i)1 which smaller
than  1+ t
Q. 6 From this, however, it in turn follows that g1 must be greater than  1+ t
Q,
which implies that no ﬁrm i will use a weight g(i)1 > g( 1+t=Q). It is easily veriﬁed that
this process converges to the equilibrium g
1, whenever  1 < a < 0.
4. Eductive stability with learning from prices
4.1. The case of exogenously given information
Let us now turn to the second equilibrium concept, where learning from current prices is
possible. It is reasonable to start this analysis with a brief discussion of a version of the
model, where the amount of private information is given. This enables us to build on some
known results and to illustrate, where these known results have to be modiﬁed if endogenous
acquisition of information is allowed for. The analysis is based on the initially considered
model with risk neutral ﬁrms and it is assumed that each ﬁrm’s signal has precision tu > 0.
When there is learning from prices, the ﬁrms are able to use the information transmitted
through the actual market price for their own decisions. Hence, proﬁt maximizing output for
a ﬁrm i 2 I is now given by x(i) = y [p E[qjs(i);p]]. In analogy to the ﬁnancial market
models considered by Desgranges (1999) and Heinemann (2002), it can then be established
that there exists an unique linear REE in this model with learning from prices.
5 From equation (3c) it follows that this is equivalent to the assumption that it is common knowledge that
t(i)u  0 for all i.
6 Using equation(3c)it canbe shownthat with respect to the amountof informationthat is acquiredthis means
that no ﬁrm will acquire information with precision greater than t u = (Q t).Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 10
Proposition 3. Let againa= y=f<0. The modelwithlearningfromprices thenpossesses




1s(i)]. The coefﬁcients g
0 and g
1 and g



























Conditionsfor existence of a SREE in thismodel withexogenouslygivenprivateinformation
are derived by Heinemann (2003). For convenience the respective conditions are reproduced





2 is a SREE if and only if a2 (g
1)
2 te <tu.
(ii) The condition (i) for existence of a SREE is equivalent to the condition that in the
rational expectations equilibrium the market price p is less informative regarding q
than the private signals.
4.2. Conditions for existence of a SREE with endogenous acquisition of information
Starting from the above described rational expectations equilibrium with exogenously given
information, it is quite easy to derive the respective equilibrium conditions for the model
with endogenous information acquisition. The reason is, that all the conditions stated in
Proposition 3 remain essentially valid. The only modiﬁcation consists in an additional
conditionwhichdescribes theoptimalequilibriumamountofprivateinformationacquisition:






(i) Each ﬁrm i 2 I will acquire the same level of precision t(i)
u = t
u = maxf0; ˜ tug of her









(ii) The coefﬁcients g
0 and g
1 and g
2 are given as in Proposition 3, that is g
1 is the unique





























Proof. See Appendix. 2
Obviously, with endogenous acquisition of information, we end up with one additional
equation, which requires that the marginal costs of the acquired information are equal to the
marginal beneﬁts from this information.
We now again ask, whether the assumptions of individual rationality and common
knowledge are sufﬁcient for a justiﬁcation of this REE. In order to derive the respective
conditions for existence of eductive stability, we have again to look a the best responses of
the individual ﬁrms to actions taken by other ﬁrms. As in the preceeding section, we conﬁne
our analysis to linear supply functions, such that an individual ﬁrm’s supply is given by
x(i) = y[(1 g(i)2)p g(i)0  g(i)1s(i)]. The respective best response mapping is then as
summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. If aggregate behavior is summarized by the coefﬁcients g0 =
R 1
0 g(j)0d j, g1 =
R 1
0 g(j)1d j and g2 =
R 1






























Proof. See Appendix. 2
Notice, that possible nonnegativityconstraints on the individually acquired precision t(i)u
are ignored in the formulation of this Lemma. As implied by deﬁnition of the REE in
Proposition 5 it might be the case that no information at all will be acquired in a REE.
Similarly, it might wll happen, that a best response of a ﬁrm i 2 I is to acquire no private
information. Since we are interested in conditions for eductive stability of a REE, where
private acquisition of information actually takes place and since the conditions we look for
are basically conditions for local stability, this restriction is not too severe. However, laterStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 12
on we will also discuss the best response dynamics under consideration of the nonnegativity
constraint on individual precisions t(i)u.
The REE is strongly rational, if the map deﬁned by equations (6a)–(6d) is contracting.
The required stability analysis can be simpliﬁed, however, since a closer look at this system
reveals, that equations (6b) and (6d) can be analyzed independently from equations (6a) and
(6c). This means that given stability of the subsystem (6b) and (6d) around g
1 and t
u, it
would be sufﬁcient to ﬁnd stability conditions for the remaining two linear equations (6a)
and (6c). Indeed, with respect to these latter two equations this is a simple task, because the
respective equations are the same as for the case with exogenously given information such
that the corresponding stability condition coincides with the condition stated in Proposition


















1 te = g
1 at the REE, this rewrites a2g2
1 te < t
u.
It therefore remains to analyze the subsystem (6b) and (6d) in order to check whether
there are any consequences of endogenous acquisition of information on the conditions for
existence of a SREE. Now, the eigenvalues l1; l2 of the Jacobian matrix of this system
evaluated at the REE are:


























1], depending on the value of k0. Some computations show that











































for stability of the subsystem (6a) and (6c) when g1 is ﬁxed. For convenience, the complete stability analysis is
given in the appendix as a proof of Proposition 6.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 13























Hence, l2 < 0.















1   (1   g
1)W  t
u, it follows that a2g2
1 te < t
u=2 is a sufﬁcient condition for
stability. It can be shown that informativeness tp of the market price p in a REE (i.e.,
1=Var(qjp)  1=Var(q)) is given by t
p  a2 (g
1)
2 te (cf. Heinemann (2002)). Thus, we
have exactly shown that a sufﬁcient condition for stability is t
p < t
u=2: the precision of
the information revealed by the equilibrium price is less than half the precision of the private
signal (t




















One sees that, given that 0 < g
1 < 1, the condition 2t
p < t
u is necessary only when k0 = 0,





































This mainly says that k0 must not be too large, nor y too small. The fact that k0 must not
be too large can be easily understood: a small k0 implies that this is not very costly to adjust
tu(i) for ﬁrm i so that this quantity cannot be easily predicted by others.
The implications of these results for existence of a SREE are summarized in the next
Proposition:Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 14
Proposition 6.
(i) If private information is endogenously acquired, a sufﬁcient condition for the rational







to be a SREE is a2 (g
1)
2 te < 1
2 t
u.








is strongly rational if and only if a2 (g
1)
2 te < 1
2 t
u.
(iii) The condition for existence of a SREE is equivalent to the condition that in the rational
expectations equilibrium the market price p is at most half as informative regarding q
than the private signals.
Proof. See Appendix. 2
The condition stated in Proposition 6 is obviously stronger than the respective condition
for existence of a SREE with exogenously given information which is stated in Proposition
4. Thus, contrary to the above considered case without learning form prices, the presence
of endogenous information acquisition in the model with learning from prices implies that
conditions for existence of a SREE have to be qualiﬁed. As usual, our condition for existence
of a SREE is based on local stability of the best response mapping. Thus, without further
restrictions on the set of strategies used by the ﬁrms, even this condition might not be
sufﬁcient for convergence of the eductive process towards the REE. This is the reason why
Guesnerie (1992), discusses the imposition of ‘credible restrictions’ on the set of strategies
which guarantee that this convergence in fact takes place. Basically, the underlying problem
is one of global versus local stability of the REE under the dynamics induced by the best
response mapping. As we will demonstrate soon for the case of constant marginal costs of
information acqusition, i.e k0 = 0, our condition for existence of a SREE is in fact necessary
and sufﬁcient for convergence of the eductive process towards the REE.
In the remainder of the paper, we will look at the case of constant marginal costs of
information acquisition in more detail. We will ﬁrst present some numerical examples which
serve to illustrate the so far derived results and then discuss the issue of global convergence
of the eductive process towards the REE.
The assumption of constant marginal costs, i.e. k(tu(i)) = ¯ k makes it possible to analyze
the best response dynamics with the help of a single equation, which results from the
substitution of equation (6b) into (6d). Equation (6d), which implies that g2
1 = 2¯ k
y t2
u, can then
be used to eliminate g1. 8 With Q 
q
y
2 ¯ k , the resulting equation then can be interpreted as
the individual best response t0
u(i) = T(tu) to the ‘amount of information in the market’ tu:
8 Equation (6d) implies g(i)1 =tu(i)=Q. Integratingover all i 2 I then gives g1 =tu=Q, where tu =
R 1
0 tu(i)di.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 15








Equation (7) describes the best response dynamics for the endogenously acquired amount
of private information and implicitly also the best response dynamics for the weight g(i)1,
whichisgiventothisprivateinformationintheindividualsupplyfunction.Theconsequences
of these best response dynamics for the remaining weights g(i)0 as well as g(i)2 will be
discussed later. Notice, that the best response function (7) now explicitly accounts for the
above mentioned nonegativity constraint on the individually acquired amount of precision
t0(i)u.
We willnow illustratethe properties of the best responsemapping(7) withsomenumerical
examples.
Example 1: Consider a numerically speciﬁed version of the model where a =  0:85,
y = 1, t = 0:1 and te = 1. Marginal costs of information acquisition are constant and given
by ¯ k = 0:5. From equation (6b) and (6d), the values for g1 and tu in a rational expectations
equilibrium can be computed as: g
1 = 0:621197 as well as t
u = 0:621197. 9 Now let us look
ﬁrst at the case where the amount of private information is exogenously given and equal to
t




is satisﬁed since a2teg
1
2 = 0:278803.
If we now consider the case where information is endogenously acquired, the stronger




u, which is also satisﬁed, since
t
u=2 = 0:310599. Thus, in this case the fact that information acquisition is endogenously
determined is not relevant for existence of a SREE.
Figure 2 shows how this function T(tu) looks like in case of the underlying numerical
speciﬁcation. Since tu is necessarily nonnegative, it is common knowledge that tu  0. As
the ﬁgure reveals, it is always individuallyoptimalto acquire information, as long as no other
ﬁrm does it. If tu = 0, the corresponding maximum amount of private information a ﬁrm will
ever acquire is given by T(0) = Q t > 0. Since it is therefore also common knowledge
that tu  T(0), it follows that no ﬁrm will ever choose t(i)u < T(T(0)) = T(Q t). This
means that no ﬁrm expects the amount of information in the market to be such large that it
becomes optimal to stop the individual acquisition of information. As indicated in the ﬁgure,
the dynamics that result if this kind of reasoning is iterated, are similar to the well known
cobweb–dynamics. The condition stated in Proposition 6 then ensures that these dynamics
9 The respective values for g
0 and g
2 are omitted here. They are not of interest, since they do not appear in the
stability conditions.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 16
Fig. 2. Best response mapping T(tu) for example 1













Fig. 3. Best response mapping T(tu) for example 2













u.In thiscase eachﬁrm caneduce thatonlytheprecisionREE
t
u = 0:621197 constitutes possible solution under the assumptions of individual rationality
and common knowledge. 10
10 The formal proof that the dynamics indeed converge towards the REE will be given below.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 17
Example 2: In this example, the precision of noise is given by te = 2:0 and, hence,
larger than in example 1. In the REE we have g
1 = 0:515703 and t
u = 0:515703. Since
a2teg
1
2 = 0:384297, this REE is still eductively stable, if information is assumed to
be exogenously given, but not (since t
u=2 = 0:257851), when information acquisition is
endogenous. Thus, we have here an example where a SREE exists if the amount of private
information is exogenously given, but does not exist if there is endogenous acquisition
of information. The best response function T(tu) depicted in ﬁgure 3 reveals that in this
example we have T(Q t) = 0, i.e. now the nonnegativity constraint on t0(i)u becomes
relevant.This examplethen givesrise to an interpretationwhich is quitesimilarto the famous
Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox (cf. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). As the ﬁgure shows, it is
again individually optimal to acquire private information, as long there is no information
in the market, i.e. T(0) = Q t > 0. If, however, each ﬁrm acquires this amount of private
information such that tu =T(0)=Q t, there is so much information in the market, that it is
individually optimal to stop the acquisition of information, i.e. T(Q t) = 0. This is indeed
quite similar to the Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox where the impossibility of informationally
efﬁcient markets is claimed.The underlyingproblem there is that the informationrevealed by
prices makes it unattractive to spend any resources for the acquisition of private information.
A similar problem appears here, where, because of nonexistence of a SREE, it is not possible
by rational agents to rule out the possibility that no ﬁrm acquires information privately, since
it mightbe that prices are too informative.Starting from the fact that it is commonknowledge
that tu(i)  0 for all i, the ﬁrms therefore are able to educe that no ﬁrm will ever acquire
information with precision larger than Q t, but they are not able restrict this set of possible
precisions any further. Thus, in this case the whole set [0; Q t] is compatible with the
assumptions of individual rationality and common knowledge,
Example 3: In this ﬁnal expample, we look at a speciﬁcation, where the precision of the
noise is given by te = 1:3, which is between the two values considered in the above two
examples. From equations (6b) and (6d), the values for g1 and tu in a rational expectations
equilibrium can be computed as g
1 = 0:58193 and t
u = 0:58193. If the case, where the
amount t
u of private information is assumed to be exogenously given, is again considered
ﬁrst, it turns out that a SREE exists, since a2teg
1
2 = 0:31807, which is smaller than
t





u, which is not satisﬁed, since t
u=2 = 0:290965. Again, a SREE exists if the
amount of private information is exogenously given, but does not exist if information is
endogenously acquired.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 18













This numerical example is particuslarly interesting because it gives rise to a special
kind of best response dynamics. To see this look at ﬁgure 4 where again the function
T(tu) is plotted. In addition, however, we have now also plotted the second iterate of this
function T2(tu)  T(T(tu)). As can be seen, this function possesses two additional ﬁxed
points, denoted tu and tu. Notice too that the associated 2–cycle is stable. If we repeat the
argumentation used in the discussion of the ﬁrst two examples, we therefore get a process
which converges to this 2–cycle: T(0) = Q  t > 0 implies that an individual ﬁrm will
always acquire information, as long as there is no information at all in the market. As
from this it follows that it is common knowledge that tu  Q t, no ﬁrm will ever aquire a
precision smaller than T(Q t) = T2(0). Hence, no ﬁrm ever expects so much information
in the market that it becomes optimal to stop the individual acquisition of information.
Iterating this argument allows only to eliminate precisions outside the interval [tu;tu] as
being incompatible with individual rationality and common knowledge. However, since the
REE t
u is not a SREE, all precisions in the set [tu;tu] still constitute possible solutions under
individual rationality and common knowledge. As the above discussed example 2 revealed,
this kind of dynamics not necessarily emerges if the stability condition of Proposition 6 is
violated. Moreover,existence of a SREE excludes the possibilityof such a 2–cycle in the best
response dynamics such that the associated best response dynamics indeed converge towards
the REE precision.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 19
Bearing in mind that the ‘amount of information in market’ tu is necessarily non–negative
and Q t is the maximum precision ever acquired, we can restrict the analysis of the best
response dynamics described by the mapping T(tu) to the set S = [0;Q t]. Given this, the
results regarding rationalizable precisions unformally described in the above three examples
can then be gathered in the next proposition:
Proposition 7. Consider the case with constant marginal costs of information acqusisition
described by best response mapping T(tu) according to (7) with tu restricted to the set
S = [0; Q t]. Let S denote the set of rationalizable precisions which therefore represent
outcomes of an eductive learning process on the side of the ﬁrms:
(a) If a SREE exists, S = t
u, i.e. t
u is the unique stable ﬁxed point of the mapping
t0
u = T(tu).
(b) If no SREE exits, the following two cases can be distinguished:
(b.1) If Q t  Q2
a2te we have S = [0;Q t], i.e. all precisions in S are compatible with




a2te  Q   t < Q2
a2te, we have S = [tu; tu]  S, i.e. the set of precisions
compatible with individual rationality and common knowledge is a strict subset
of S.
Proof. See Appendix. 2
Notice that Proposition 7 connects the above derived condition for existence of a SREE,
which requires prices in a REE to be at most half as informative than private signals
directly with the parameters of the model. This is possible in case of constant marginal
costs of information acqusition, because in this special case a2(g
1)2te < 1
2t





An immediate consequence of Proposition 7 is that the REE is the unique rationalizable
solution of our market model, whenever it is strongly rational. This must be true, since
existence of a SREE implies that the REE is a stable stationary point of the whole dynamical
system given by equations (6a)—(6d). Thus, given the restriction of constant marginal
costs of information acquisition, we get the result that individual rationality and common
knowledge are indeed sufﬁcient in order to justify the REE as an outcome of our market
model with learning from price. However, this is true only if the price in the REE is at most
half as informative as private signals. If this condition for existence of an SREE fails to hold,
individual rationality and common knowledge alone are not sufﬁcient to justify the REE. In
the following section we will discuss this latter case in more detail.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 20
4.3. Nonexistence of an SREE and the Grossman–Stiglitz–Paradox
While nonexistence of an SREE implies that the hypotheses of individual rationality and
common knowledge are not sufﬁcient to predict the REE as a reasonable outcoem of our
model, Proposition 7 also reveals that it might still be possible to restrict the set of precisions
in such a case.
Figure 5 displays the implications of this Proposition. The ﬁgure shows the set of
rationalizable precisions tu dependend on the precision of the noise te. Notice, that an
increase in the precision of the noise implies an increase in the precision of the market
price even though the amount of information acquired in the REE becomes smaller when
te grows. 11 Hence, as te increases when we move along the horizontal axis in the ﬁgure,
the informativeness t
p of the market price in the REE increases too. The solid line in the
ﬁgure represents the amount of information acquisition in the REE, which decreases as te
increases.
Now, as long te < 3
4
Q2
a2[Q t], which is equivalent to t
p < t
u=2, a SREE exists. Thus, the
corresponding part of the solid line also represents the set ao rationalizable precisions, which
coincides with the REE precision. If te  3
4
Q2
a2[Q t], no SREE exists. The shaded area in the
ﬁgure representsallprecisionsthatarerationalizableinsuchacase.Ascanbe seen,whenever
the precision of prices is not too large, i.e. if te <
Q2
a2[Q t], the best response dynamics
exhibit a two–cycle and the hypotheses of individual rationality and common knowledge
lead to restrictions on the set of rationalizable precisions. Even this is impossbile, when price
become too informative, i.e. if te  Q2
a2[Q t].
As prices become fully informative regarding the unknown parameter, which would
happen in our model if te ! ¥, the famous Grossman-Stiglitz-Paradox appears: In such a
case, no ﬁrm has an incentive to acquire costly the information, prices will reveal anyway. If,
however, no ﬁrm acquires any information, the market price cannot be revealing. In this case
no REE exists.
This problem cannot arise, whenever the precision te of the noise is bounded from above,
because then the precision of the market price is bounded from above too and thus, a
REE exists. However, while this means that the Grossmann–Stiglitz–Paradox in its original
shape does not show up in this case, the essentiell problem underlying it is still present. If
the te is bounded from above but greater than Q2
a2[Q t], individual rationality and common
knowledge are not sufﬁcient to exclude the possibility that it is indivually optimal to acquire
no private information because there is already much information in the market. Since
11 From Proposition 5 we get that in a REE g
1 = t
u=Q, such that t
p is given by t
p = a2(t
u)2te.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 21
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the corresponding best response mapping implies that it is optimal to acquire information
individually if no other ﬁrm does it, but to stop the acquisition of information if every ﬁrms
behaves like this, it is not possible to restrict the set S of precisions any further. This problem
disappears only if prices are even less informative,which is the case if te < Q2
a2[Q t]. In such a
case the hypotheses of individual rationality and common knowledge indeed provide further
restrictions on the set of precisions, but even then the set of rationalizable precisions not
necessarily coincides with the REE precision.
Viewed from this perspective, the main result of the paper can be summarized as follows:
Whenever prices are fully informative, no REE exists, since there is no incentive to acquire
information. As the informativeness of prices becomes smaller, e.g. because te becomes
smaller, a REE exists, but it may be impossible to justify this REE using the assumptions of
rationality and common knowledge, since no SREE exist. Only if the informational content
of prices falls short of a certain upper bound, it is at least possible to predict that rational
individual behavior will be restricted to a particular set of actions and only for an even lower
informativeness of prices a SREE exists.
Let us ﬁnally analyse, what we can say regarding the remaining two weights g0, g1 and g2
of the individual supply function in case of nonexistence of a SREE. Let us begin with the
case where the mappingT(tu) possesses a stable two–cycle.This means that the assumptions
of common knowledge and rationality restrict the set of possible individual precisions to the
set [t
u; ¯ t
u]. Since g(i)1 =
p
Q
 1t(i)u, set of individual weights for this private information is










u].Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 22























It remains to ask whether it is also possible to restrict the remaining two weights g0 and
g2 to particular sets. This requires to analyze the dynamical properties of the two equations
(6a) and (6c) for all values for g1 that are rationalizable, i.e., for all g1 2 [g
1; ¯ g
1]. The next





a2te  Q t < Q2
a2te, such that S = [tu; tu] and g(i)1 can be restricted to
the set [g







0; g0] as well as [g
2; g2] denote the set of
ﬁxed points of equations (6a) and (6c) given g1 2 [g
1; g1] and tu 2 S. These sets then
represent all values for the weights g0 as well as g2 which are compatible with common
knowledge and rationality.




hypotheses of rationality and common knowledge impose no further restrictions on the
weights g0 and g2
Proof. See Appendix. 2
Figure 6 serves to illustrate this result. The ﬁgure shows the best response function for
the weight g0 according to equation (6a) in case of a two–cycle for all values of g1 within
the set [g
1; ¯ g
1]. The result stated in Proposition 8 builds on the fact that the maximum ofStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 23
slopes of these best responses (i.e. the slope of the straight line g0
0(g0; ¯ g
1) ) is less then one
in absolute value, whenever a stable two–cycle exists. Given this it is possible to restrict
the set of weights g0 that are compatible with rationality and common knowledge to values
corresponding to the line segment between the points P and P0 in the ﬁgure. 12 In a similar
fashion it can be shown that regarding the weight g2 there exists a set [g
2; ¯ g
2] of weights such
that all g2 within this set are compatible with rationality and common knowledge. Thus, even
if there may exist no SREE, the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge allow
to restrict the set of possible supply functions that will be used by rational ﬁrms, when a
stable two–cycle exists. If even this is not the case, that is, if not even a stable two–cycle
exists, it is still possible to restrict the weights g1 and the precisions tu of the privately
acquired information, but the best response mappings (6a) and (6c) are unstable for some
of the reasonable values for g1 and tu. This means any values for g0 and g2 are compatible
with rationality and common knowledge in this case.
5. Conclusions
In the present paper, we have shown how known results for existence of SREE must be
modiﬁed, if models with endogenously acquired private information are considered. While
this assumptions does not lead to modiﬁcations of the respective conditions for existence
when there is no learning from prices, it turns out we arrive at stronger conditions if there is
such learning. In particular, it was shown that prices in a REE need to be half as informative
than privatesignalsfor a SREE to existin case of learning from prices, whereas it issufﬁcient
for prices to be less informative than private signals without such learning. It was also
possible to give an interpretation of the result that falls back on the well known Grossman–
Stiglitz Paradox of the impossibility of informationally efﬁcient markets. Viewed from this
perspective, our result says that for existence of a SREE markets have to show a minimum
level of informational inefﬁciency.
Future work on this subject will analyze the case of increasing marginal costs of informa-
tion acquisition in more detail in order to check the robustness of the results obtained for the
case of constant marginal costs. Moreover, it should be analyzed whether the results carry
over to ﬁnancial market models with learning from current prices, where risk aversion of
traders is allowed for.
12 The underlying argument is quite similar to the one presented in section 3 in the discussion of ﬁgure 1.Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 24
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We will ﬁrst show, that there exists an unique linear equilibrium with given
precisions tu(i)  0 for all i 2 I. After that, we derive the optimal individual amount of information





0 g(i)1di=g1 as well asxs =
R 1
0 x(i)di=y[g0+g1q]
such strategies result in the market price:
p = b+a [g0+g1q]+e
where a= y=j.Fromthis itfollows p q=b+ag0+(ag1 1)q+e and the respective conditional
expectation of a ﬁrm i 2 I results as:


























Now assume t(i)u = t




















Itremains to derive the optimal individual amount of information acquisition. Assume that the costs
associated with information acquisition are given by K(t(i)u) and let k(t(i)u) denote the respective























We can write Eq. (A.4) as follows:
p(i) = y

b+(ag1 1)[q  ¯ q]+(ag1 1)¯ q+ag0+e









b+g(i)0+g(i)1[s(i)  ¯ q]+g(i)1 ¯ q
2
 K(t(i)u)
















































































Under the assumption of an equilibrium with g(i)1 = g
1 and t(i)u = t





(t+(1 a)˜ tu)2 = k(˜ tu) (A.7)
Eq. (A.7) will not necessarily possess a solution with t
u > 0. In such a case, the respective solution
is t
u = 0. Together with the above derived Eqs. (A.3a) and (A.3b) the REE is then completely
described. 2
Proof of Lemma 1. The best response mapping has already been derived while proving Proposition
1. It is given by Eqs.(A.6a)–(A.6c).

































































































We write this system as x0 = Px, where P = A 1B. Since it turns out that P is a triangular matrix, its
eigenvalues are equal the elements on its main diagonal. The respective eigenvalues l1;l2 and l3 are:











Proof of Proposition 5. The proof parallels the proof of Proposition 1. Starting point again is that







2 K(t(i)u) (A.9)Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 27
Since we assume a linear supply rule and are only interested in the optimal choice of t(i)u, only the





























Thus, the necessary condition for the optimal amount of information acquisition is the same as in the
case, where there is no learning from prices. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. The best response mapping for the case with a given amount of private
information (i.e., Eqs. (6a)– (6c) is derived in Heinemann (2003). The additional Eq. (6d) has been
derived in the above given proof of Proposition 5. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. The relevant dynamical system is given by Eqs. (6a) – (6d). The total














































u(i) = 0; (A.14)
where Z = t+t
u +a2g
1



















































































































AStrongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 28
We write this system as x0 = Px, where P = A 1B. Since it turns out that P is a triangular matrix, its
eigenvalues are equal the elements on its main diagonal. The respective eigenvalues l1 ::: l4 are:












The condition for stability of this dynamical system and, thus, the condition for existence of a SREE
is that all eigenvalues are less than one in absolute value.
If we now assume that marginal costs of information acquisition are constant and equal to ¯ k, such
that k0 = 0, we haveW = tu
g1. From equation (6b) it follows that in equilibrium W = t+tua2g2
1te and
from this we get (1 g1)W = t+a2g2
























Proof of Proposition 7. The proof proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step is to derive some properties
of the mapping T2(tu) in order to ﬁnd conditions for the existence of a 2–cycle in the best response
mapping. The second step then draws the relevant conclusions.
(1) Consider the function f(tu)=Q t  a2te
Q2 tu
2, which appears in Eq.(7) and let f 2(tu) denote its
second interate, i.e. f 2(tu)  f(f(tu)). It is straightforward to show that (a) f 2(tu) is monotone
and increasing and that (b) f 2(tu) has exactly one inﬂection point for tu > 0:
a) With respect to the derivative with respect to tu, f20(tu), we get:
f20
(tu) = f0(tu) f0(f(tu))  0
because f 0(tu)  0.














With Q t > 0, this equation possesses two real roots, such that there are two points
of inﬂection where f 200(tu) = 0 and at most one such point in S = [0;Q   t]. Since
T(tu) = maxf0; f(tu)g, it then follows, that T2(tu) is monotone increasing on S with
at most one point of inﬂection.
(2) Consider now the case where no SREE exists. This implies jT 0(t
u)j>1 and therefore T20(t
u)>
1. From the above derived properties of T 2(tu) it then follows that a 2–cycle with 0 <tu < ¯ tu <Strongly rational expectations equilibria ::: 29











As an REE with t




If this condition is satisﬁed, a stable 2–cycle is a solution of the mapping t 0
u = T(tu), and the
best response dynamics converge to this 2–cycle. Thus, S = [tu; ¯ tu] in this case. Otherwise, no
sich cycle exists and because t
u is unstable, we have S = S.
(3) Consider ﬁnally the case where jT0(t
u)j < 1 such that a SREE exists. In this case we have
T20(t
u) < 1. Moreover, from t
u = T(t





































As this implies T(0) > 0 (cf. eq. (A.16)), a 2–cycle cannot exist in this case. Hence t
u is the
unique stable ﬁxed point of the mapping t 0
u = T(tu) and S = t
u.
2















It must be shown that this slope is smaller than one in absolute value for the maximum value, the
weight g1 can attain, if and only if T2(0) > 0.






This precision implies that g1 = ¯ tu=Q, which is the maximum value g1 can attain, as well as t0
u = 0.
In this case, the slope is given by:




























From (A.17) it follows that jGj < 1 if and only if Q t < ¯ tu, and because T(tu) is monotone
decreasing, this requires T2(0) = T(T(0)) = T(Q t) > 0. 2Working Paper Series in Economics
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